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being pursued. The new world and the new economy does mean that the old strategic logic 
is outmoded. Instead we see a significant change in the strategic context that results in the 
logic of competitive advantage being applied in different ways. 
The chapter presents and contrasts the differences between the old world of scale and 
scope economies and the new world of network externalities. There is an extensive dis- 
cussion of what network externalities are and how they arise but the reader should read this 
in the context of addition, not replacement – scale and scope have not been replaced; there 
is, however, another important practical phenomenon to consider. Networks are supported 
by many layers of infrastructure and we go into some detail to show how the technological 
infrastructure can be identified and analysed. There are many implications for competition 
which we review. Finally, we summarize the implications for strategy – although it is a new 
world, the logic of competitive advantage still applies. 
 
 
12.1  The need for a new strategic perspective 
The new information and communication technologies of the last decade are fundamentally 
transforming the operating methods of most manufacturing and service companies and are 
provoking wholesale reappraisal of the nature of support functions. These technologies have 
become institutionalized in the new ICT (information and communications technology) 
industry across the world and are now having a revolutionary effect on corporate strategy. 
Executives are rethinking the strategic fundamentals of business practices not just in tech- 
nology and communications industries but also across the entire spectrum of industries. 
Many of the component parts of this new ICT industry, such as telecommunications, the 
internet, computing and software, are shaping significant parts of the corporate environ- 
ment into a new ‘network economy’. The essence of networks is the existence of multiple 
nodes, the interconnectivity between them, and the co-operative (as opposed to competi- 
tive) behaviour of the nodes. As we will see, networks have increasing returns to scale 
characteristics. The dynamics of corporations and the new information economy will 
increasingly reflect these increasing returns to scale and, therefore, understanding how such 
networks work is the key to developing a new set of strategies in this new information-based 
corporate landscape (Kelly 1998). 
The ‘old world’ was driven by economies of scale and scope, where the benefits of size are 
moderated by eventual diminishing returns. The ‘new world’, spawned by information and 
communications technology, is not moderated  by  the  normally  powerful  influence  of 
diminishing returns. Network effects, also known as network externalities, can result in 
‘winner-takes-all’ phenomena (for example, the  Wintel  standard  for  PCs)  and  therefore 
result in  new  industry dynamics  and  new  sets of corporate  responses  (for  a discussion  of 
network  effects, see  McGee  and  Sammut-Bonnici  2002). 
The burgeoning growth and influence of the new ICT industry is making it possible for 
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more individuals, corporations and companies to reap the benefits of the  information 
economy. The internet has provided a free infrastructure for the rapid exchange of infor- 
mation and is creating new distribution opportunities in regional and global economies. 
The development of the ‘self-organizing’ web of new economy industries is affecting all 
elements of trade and brings commercial gains to  regional  and  global  economies. The 
Digital Planet 2002 report indicates the scale of this effect. At the regional level, Eastern 
Europe’s spending grew faster in 2001 than the North America, Latin America, Middle East 
and Africa regions combined. Mature economies such as the US will become less dominant, 
as China, Poland and a host of other developing countries play an increasing role. At a more 
micro level, information industries are giving rise to geographic hot-spots of commercial 
activity, created from economic webs, corporate clusters and commercial ecosystems. 
California’s Silicon Valley, Taiwan and Tokyo are such examples. Local concentration of ICT 
activity may develop spontaneously or can be created by governments and regional plan- 
ners. Malaysia is developing two of the world’s first Smart Cities: Putrajaya, the new seat of 
government providing e-government facilities, and Cyberjaya, a city for multimedia indus- 
tries, R&D centres, a multimedia university and operational headquarters of multinationals 
wishing to direct their trading activities using information  technology.  The  underlying 
feature of smart cities is the high level of ICT infrastructure, on which the whole city is 
developed. Another example of regional growth due to the information economy  is 
Northern Virginia. Its economy has boomed with the explosion of internet and telecommu- 
nication companies. America Online, which set up in Northern Virginia in 1985, employs 
over 13 000 people, and generates over $1.5 billion in online revenues. The presence of a 
number of multinational companies such as AOL, UUNet and Worldcom MCI in the area 
attracts competitors as well as vendors through the normal multiplier effects. ICT Industries 
have well-documented, substantial effects on the local, regional and  global  economies 
through the multiplier effect. 
 
The extent to which the ICT industry and associated network industries have proliferated 
in the economy is a recent phenomenon. However, network effects have been recognized for 
some time, since the onset of industrialization, but particularly with the advent of the first 
infrastructure industries (especially railroads) in Victorian times. Literature on network 
externalities dates back by almost a century to the works of Young (1913), Knight (1924), 
and Ellis and Fellner (1943). Contemporary research on networks tends to be econometric 
in nature (Shy 2001) and charts industry evolution over time in a series of snapshots. We 
adopt Shapiro and Varian’s (1999) strategic perspective on network industries and develop 
a strategic framework that transcends ICT and non-ICT companies. We start this journey by 
analysing the structure of network industries and go on to look at the dynamics endemic in 
each level within that structure. 
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12.2 The emergence of a new economy 
In this section we look at how the old industrial economy was characterized by economies 
of scale and scope, while the new information economy is driven by the economics of posi- 
tive feedback in network industries. We will discuss the nature of network industries, such 
as railroads, telecommunications, software and hardware networks. We will see how network 
companies benefit from positive feedback on both the demand side and supply side. On the 
demand side, the more customers join a network, such as a telecommunications service, the 
higher the incentive for other customers to join. On the supply side, the larger a network 
becomes in terms of users and also in size of assets deployed, the easier it is for a company 
to lower costs and prices. The lower the price introduced by a network company, the more 
subscribers will join the network and positive feedback kicks in. The result is a self- 
reinforcing spiral. The importance of critical mass, competition and standards is discussed 
in the light of the dynamics of positive feedback. 
 
12.2.1 The old world: economies of scale and scope 
The theory of strategic management was given impetus by the realization that industrial 
organization as a subject could be turned around to give a perspective on the entrepreneurial 
profit-seeking activity of firms. This led to the notion of firms seeking market power in 
which rents could be protected, at least for a time, by barriers to entry. These barriers were 
derived from the cost functions of firms, the dominant theme being the ability of firms to 
sustain differential cost positions through economies of scale.2 In the world of scale 
economies, where minimum efficient plant sizes are a significant fraction of the market, oli- 
gopolistic market structures prevail and are overturned principally by the growth of markets 
or by the advance of technology enabling the creation of new assets with more advantageous 
cost positions. The notion of economies of scale is therefore fundamental to strategic man- 
agement because it provides a rationale for firms to be different in terms of asset 
configuration and in terms of performance. However, this is an insufficient argument on its 
own for the existence of diversified firms. Diversification requires the notion of economies 
of scope. These are defined as ‘the cost savings realized when two different products are pro- 
duced within the same organization rather than at separate organizations’ (Saloner et al. 
p. 364). They arise because the products share a common input such as plant or equipment, 
obtaining volume discounts on purchases (exercising monopsony power), or applying 
 
 
2 Saloner, Shepard and Podolny (2001) identify three types of entry barriers: barriers from production or 
distribution technology, barriers from brand name or reputation, and legal barriers (p. 138). The first 
two are essentially cost barriers in that replication of the incumbent’s assets is inhibited by the costs of 
so doing. The third type is an absolute barrier that arises from institutional characteristics that are 
idiosyncratic from a market point of view. 
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common expertise or reputation. The advantages conferred by economies of scope are not, 
however, inherent in the jointness of production but in the barrier to entry which protects 
the ‘original’ asset. There is nothing to prevent two firms enjoying identical economies 
of scope if there is free competition for the underlying asset. Thus, economies of scale 
convey the fundamental advantage that underpins superior profitability in single-product 
and multiple-product firms. 
The discussions in strategic management textbooks about competitive advantage are all 
variations upon this same theme. The simplest articulation of the theme is the cost differen- 
tial that arises in production. The more complex argument concerns knowledge assets, 
where the essence of the argument is about the cost to reproduce knowledge and not the 
possession of knowledge per se. The subtlety in strategy making resides in the variety of ways 
in which knowledge and expertise is acquired (which is where the cost function of knowl- 
edge acquisition is important) and then captured in products and services (the generic 
differentiation theme). In this almost bucolic world the supply side and the market side are 
linked through some form of arm’s-length market exchange process. Customer desires are 
conveyed through the pattern of their purchasing decisions and producers respond by 
adjusting the nature of their offerings. Where competition is monopolistic (or imperfect) 
producers may attempt to shape customer preferences, and to the extent they succeed, 
demand functions become downward sloping in the conventional manner and producers 
can then price according to the nature of their marginal cost curves and the price elasticities 
in the market. But demand and supply are mediated through a market mechanism in which 
product demand is independent of other products3 and demand is not time dependent. This 
latter point is crucial. 
 
12.2.2 The new world of network industries 
However, there is a class of markets and industries that do not conform to these assump- 
tions. These are known as network industries.4 According to Economides and Flyer (1997): 
The value of nearly every good is influenced by aggregate consumption levels in its 
market and in the markets for related goods. In many cases, high aggregate con- 
sumption in its own market, and in the markets for complementary goods affects 
positively the value of a good. Traditionally such effects have been called network 
externalities, since they were first identified in network industries. While such 
effects are salient in some markets, such as for telephones, fax machines and com- 
puter operating systems, for most goods these influences are more subtle and tend 
to be smaller. 
 
 
3   This exaggerates the point, as we will see later when we discuss product complementarity. 
4    In this discussion the terms ‘industry’ and ‘market’ are used as if interchangeable. 
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Network industries are not uncommon. Many physical networks have been around for a 
long time, e.g. railroads, telephone, electricity. So-called virtual networks have arisen largely 
through information technology and include facsimile machines and computer operating 
systems. These are ‘virtual’ because the key knowledge and information assets are intangible. 
We can distinguish intuitively between pure networks and indirect or weak networks. Pure 
networks exist where it is an essential characteristic of the product that it is organized 
through complementary nodes and links, such as a railway network or the telephone system. 
A key element is the notion of complementarity, thus the value of a railway station is derived 
from the existence of other railway stations on the network. A weaker definition relies also 
on complementarity between products (or nodes, in network language) but allows the links 
to be created by the customer rather than for the customer. Economides and Flyer (1997) 
have some powerful examples: 
the value of a washing machine is affected by the aggregate consumption of 
washing machines and the consumption level of the particular brand, since this 
determines the availability of parts, repairmen, detergents, fabric softeners and 
various other related goods and services. The value of a sporting event is influenced 
by the aggregate size of the audience, as this enhances the excitement level, analysis, 
discussion and remembrance of the event. Even a grapefruit is influenced by 
network externalities, since the variety of accessible complements, such as peeler, 
slicers, juicers, recipes, nutritional information and specialized spoons, are affected 
by the aggregate consumption of the fruit. 
The essence of this idea is that the demand for a product is influenced by total demand for 
the product class or by total demand in a complementary product class. Thus, demand is 
conditioned by a consumer externality. Where these consumer externalities are powerful, 
the feedback effect on demand is such that there is a tendency towards a single network, or 
platform, or standard. The value for consumers of being on a common standard outweighs 
any specific differences between alternative standards. We see that the VHS standard was 
preferred to a ‘technically better’ Betamax rival to the extent that the rival standard disap- 
peared. The Wintel standard is greatly preferred to the Apple standard although the rival 
does still exist as a small niche in the market. Where the externality is smaller and the 
intrinsic difference between standards is relatively larger then we might observe multiple 
competing and co-existing ‘platforms’.5 An example of a platform can be seen in the auto- 
mobile industry, where a company might develop a core of components and sub-assemblies 
that can be used to support alternative body styling to create a product range. Such a plat- 
form can co-exist with other platforms because the scale efficiencies associated with 
platforms is modest in relation to market size. 
 
5    To observe multiple standards defies common sense, hence the term ‘platform’ which denotes an array 
of  linked complementary products that together are compatible with other products. 
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12.3 Networks 
What is the significance of networks and network externalities? To answer this we need to 
look first at what we mean by networks. Then we look at the implications for the demand 
function and the consequences for the market and the industry structure. 
A network is a set of connections (links) between nodes. A two-way network allows the 
links to be operated in both directions, whereas a one-way network has distinct direction- 
ality. Two-way networks include railroads and telephone systems. Figure 12.1 shows a simple 
star network where A can communicate with B through a switch S. B can also communicate 
with A by reversing the direction of the link (viz. a telephone call). In Figure 12.1 we have 
eight nodes (A through H) linked through a switch, S. If this were a two-way network, AB 
and BA would be distinct products (different telephone calls, different rail journeys). The 
total number of products in the network is 56, i.e. n(n-1) where n = the number of nodes. 
If there were to be a ninth member this would increase the total number of products to 72 
(n is now 9), a total increase of 16 products available from the expanded network. If the 
value to each user of being in the network is proportional to the number of users then the 
value of this network has just increased by 28.5 per cent (16 as a percentage of 56) even 
though the size of the network has increased by only 12.5 per cent (one added to eight).6 
This is an algebraic characteristic of network economies of scale: that the value rises dispro- 
portionately higher than the increase in network size as long as prices are constant and 
products are independent. Intuitively we might expect that an increase in network size 
eyond a certain point has little value.7 If this network were a one-way network there would 
be half the number of products but the value of the network would nevertheless increase at 
the same rate but achieving only half the value. 
The analysis of complementarity is equivalent to the analysis of a one-way network. Figure 
12.1 can be extended, as in Figure 12.2, to show a typical one-way network. Here we can 
8 
interpret the Ai as ATMs and the Bj as banks. The network runs only from A to B. The sig- 
nificance of the two switches SA and SB is that they have only one link. This means that there 
is compatibility between all ATMs and all banks. This maximizes the value of the network 
but increases the competition between banks for customers through ATMs.9 It is this com- 
patibility that makes the complementarity actual and the network operational. For complex 
 
 
6    Assuming for convenience in this example that prices are constant. 
7 Using calculus we would expect the first derivative to be positive but the second derivative to be nega- 
tive. Therefore, total value increases but at a decreasing rate. 
8    Automatic teller machines 
9 Two complementary components, A and B, are compatible when they can be combined to produce a 
composite good. A VHS player is compatible with VHS tapes. Two substitute components A1 and A2 are 
compatible when each of them can be combined with a complementary good B to produce a composite 
good. Thus two VHS tapes are compatible, and two VHS players are compatible. 
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A star network has a collection of nodes clustered 
around some central resource. Movement of 
resources/products must pass through this central 
node, e.g. a local telephone exchange. 
 
Figure 12.1 A simple star network 
products actual complementarity has to be 
achieved through adherence to specific 
technical standards. Other complementary 
products  can  be  visualized  in  terms  of 
 
Occurs when the central resouces are distributed 
among connected star networks. In a normal star 
network, movement can occur from any point on the 
network to any other point. Movement from one star 
to another will involve both central connections (hubs). 
Movement within one star will require only one – 
e.g. long-distance telephone network 
 
 
Figure 12.2 A crystal ‘one-way’ network 
Figure 12.2. VHS tapes could be the Ai and VHS players could be the Bj. Think also of copier 
paper and copiers, or printer paper and printers, or car accessories and cars, or local and 
long-distance telephone networks. 
 
 
Case box: Real and virtual networks 
 
The concept of network can be segmented into real and virtual networks (Shapiro and Varian 
1999). Real networks are found in industries such as telephony and railways where a physical 
network is present. Virtual networks are typified by computer and software platforms where 
the interconnection between users is intangible. The two types of networks are discussed 
below. 
In real networks the interconnection between users is tangible. Examples are cable net- 
works for telephone users and radio transmissions in mobile phones. Electricity grids, 
telecommunications networks encompassing telephones, fax machines, online services and 
the internet are typical examples of products or services within real networks. There are 
one-way networks, such as broadcast television, where information flows in one direction 
only. In two-way networks, such as railroads and telephone systems, links are operated in 
both directions. Any network may be viewed as a set of connections (links) between 
nodes. A two-way network allows the links to be operated in both directions whereas a 
one-way network has specific direction. Two-way networks include railroads and tele- 
phone systems. 
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In virtual networks the interconnections between users are intangible, but users remain 
interdependent. Computer systems are typical of virtual networks. For example, Mac users 
are part of the Mac network, with Apple as the sponsor of the network. Mac users are locked 
into a network determined by the technology standard of this platform. They can only use 
software that is compatible to the system and will exchange files with users within the 
system. Operating systems such as Windows and Unix are other examples of virtual net- 
works. Virtual network dynamics also operate in the entertainment industry for Sony 
PlayStation, Microsoft Xbox and Nintendo’s Gamecube networks. 
Network size is still important in virtual networks in that a large consumer base makes pro- 
duction viable and usage possible. In addition, the value of a product increases as the number 
of, or the variety of, the complementary goods or services increases. Indirect network effects 
in the computer industry are referred to as the hardware–software paradigm. The success of 
an operating system for personal computers depends on the variety of software applications 
available in the market. Value may depend more critically on software applications. 
 
 
12.3.1 Network externalities: the new economic force 
Earlier in this chapter we looked at the traditional economic model for the ‘old world’, which 
was driven by economies of scale and scope. The ‘new world’, characterized by information 
and communications technology, is governed by a different dynamic. Network externalities 
are the new drivers of the network economy. It is important to recognize that economies of 
scale/scope and network externalities represent the extreme ends of a spectrum of effects, 
and that the presence of one does not imply the exclusion of the other. Companies may 
experience the effects of both to varying degrees, with a tendency for network externalities 
to have more strategic relevance in the new network economy. 
The concept of network externalities has attracted the attention of academics and prac- 
titioners alike. The extent to which network industries have proliferated in the economy is a 
recent phenomenon. The effects of network externalities, however, have been recognized for 
some time with the development of the older network companies such as the railroads and 
the electricity systems. In 1804 Trevithick constructed the first practical locomotive in 
England. In 1882 the Edison Electric Lighting Company completed the first commercial 
generating station at Holborn Viaduct in London. The first commercial telephone line was 
installed in Boston, Massachusetts, in 1877. 
Network externalities are defined as the increasing utility that a user derives from con- 
sumption of a product as the number of other users who consume the same product 
increases (Katz and Shapiro 1985). For example, the more people there are in a telephone 
network, the more users can be reached on the network, thereby increasing its usability. Fax 
machines, broadcast industry services, credit card networks, and computer hardware and 
software are examples of products exhibiting network externalities. 
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Networks were originally analysed on the assumption that each network was owned by a 
single firm and research concentrated on the efficient use of the network structure and on 
the appropriate allocation of costs (Economides 1996; Sharkey 1993). With the anti-trust 
cases against AT&T and its later break-up, attention shifted towards economies of scope, the 
efficiency gains from joint operation of complementary components of networks (Baumol 
et al. 1982). This led to issues of interconnection and compatibility in parallel with the 
reduced role of IBM in the 1980s and 1990s in the setting of technical standards in computer 
hardware and software. As technology has advanced, there have been significant reductions 
in telecommunications costs and a shift towards fragmented ownership of telecommunica- 
tions networks. Market structure has shifted from natural monopoly to oligopoly. Similar 
trends are evident in other IT-intensive industries. Thus, the focus of interest in network 
economics has shifted from the analysis of natural monopoly towards issues of interconnec- 
tion, compatibility, interoperability and co-ordination of quality. 
 
12.3.2 Network externalities and the battle for critical mass 
For normal goods, the demand curve slopes downwards. As price decreases, more of the 
product is demanded. Other elements in the demand function, such as income or adver- 
tising, serve as ‘demand shifters’ that elevate demand to a higher level. Figure 12.3 illustrates 
the traditional role of a  demand  shifter.  Higher  levels  of  consumption  are  derived 
from higher incomes (positive income elasticities) or from lower prices (negative price 
elasticities). 
This fundamental relationship is greatly distorted in the presence of network externalities. 
In the presence of network externalities, we specify that sales rise as accumulated sales (the 
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Figure 12.3 Demand shifts due to the installed base 
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installed base) rise and there arises a chicken and egg problem. Customers may not be 
interested in purchasing because the installed base is small and/or not expected to grow. For 
example, imagine the purchase of complex software without internet support, help lines and 
user groups. Alternatively, there may be confident expectations that the installed base will 
grow substantially and therefore consumers will confidently make purchases. The paradox is 
that consumers will not buy if the installed base is too low. However, the installed base is too 
low because customers will not buy. The crux of the paradox lies in the management of expec- 
tations. In markets for normal goods, equilibrium is explained in terms of a balance between 
costs and demand, between marginal costs and marginal utility. In network markets, there is 
also equilibrium to be struck between actual demand and expectations of total demand. 
This gives rise to an economic paradox. Almost the first law of economics is that value 
comes from scarcity. However, in the new economy value comes from plenty: the more 
something is demanded and the more it is expected to be demanded then the more valuable 
it becomes. Expectations are so important in driving demand that a point exists where the 
momentum is so overwhelming that success becomes a runaway event and we observe a 
‘winner takes all’ phenomenon (see Figure 12.4). 
The ‘tipping point’ is  when the installed  base (or size of network) tips expectations 
sharply towards one player (or one network) and away from its rival. We have experienced 
this effect when the market moved towards Windows as the prevailing computer operating 
system, rather than OS2. Another example  of  tipping  would  be  IBM-compatibles  versus 
Apple, as shown in Figure 12.5. The tipping point comes somewhere in 1984–5 when IBM- 
system sales overtake those of Apple. 
The exception to the winner takes all phenomenon would be a regulated network market 
with  strong  interconnections  between  competing  platforms.  The  mobile  telephone 
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Figure 12.4 Winner takes all 
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Figure 12.5  Market share of IBM and Apple 
 
 
industry is a classic example. The standards are harmonized across the network providers, 
at least by continental region. The platforms are interlinked and the sales curves of the 
regulated network providers follow the pattern of the overall subscription curve for the 
industry. 
Traditional economic thinking is based on negative feedback systems in which the strong 
get weaker at the margin and the weak get stronger, thus providing a drive towards a com- 
petitive equilibrium. This is captured in economics by the concept of diminishing marginal 
utility as consumption grows. In the new world of networks, feedback rules. In this world 
the valuation of a product increases the more that others consume the product. Strictly 
speaking, it arises from the interdependence of consumer decisions, whereas diminishing 
marginal utility dominates when consumer decisions are independent – the normal assump- 
tion in economics. 
The price–quantity relationship is normally held to be downward sloping, but the demand 
curve for a network product should be drawn differently (Figure 12.6). The value to the con- 
sumer of a network product is reflected in the price he or she is willing to pay – the vertical 
axis. The principal driver of value is the size of the network, also referred to as the installed 
base, and is shown on the horizontal axis. Quantity demanded does still have an effect on 
price but for these products, this is secondary to the network effect. 
The initial upward slope of the curve reflects a rising valuation at the margin, as con- 
sumers perceive that they gain value by virtue of other consumers having the product. Being 
on the Wintel standard gives value to new users. However, as the network grows, the extra 
consumers at the margin eventually become less valuable – i.e. this shape assumes that those 
users with higher potential valuation of the network will join first. As the network gets very 
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Figure 12.6  The network demand curve: the idea of optimal size 
 
large, further growth has less value for future customers.10 The intercept on the vertical axis 
represents the value the network product has as a stand-alone product. Thus a Wintel com- 
puter has some stand-alone value, but a telephone has no value on its own and is a pure 
network good. 
There is a notion of an optimal size of a network. This can be seen from the interaction of 
demand and cost so that as less and less valuable customers join the network there may come 
a time when the costs of acquiring and servicing new customers begins to exceed the price 
those customers are willing to pay. This determines the optimal size and has significant 
implications for competition. 
The three configurations shown in Figure 12.7 indicate the range of possibilities. The first 
is a pure network good, such as a telephone system, in which the optimal size of network is 
a very high proportion of the available market. This implies there is little or no room for 
rival networks. The second is a product with a significant intrinsic value that attracts a 
modest size group of users. For example, this could be a corporate software package (e.g. 
enterprise solutions) that attracts dedicated user support from the supplier through the web. 
Alternative networks could co-exist. The third case is one of very high intrinsic demand but 
extensive consumer interactions (small in size but very many in number) provide a substan- 
tial total network value. The obvious example is word processing software where the value 
from standardizing on MS Word is very high, with the result that alternative standards (such 
as WordPerfect) are being frozen out of the market even though the intrinsic value of any 
word processing package is high. 
 
 
10  In the language of demand curves, this is an average revenue curve. 
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Figure 12.7 Alternative network demand configurations 
 
12.4 The technological infrastructure of network 
industries 
Much of the popular discussion of technology and its effects makes powerful but general 
claims for the effect of technology but is less than clear about the underlying mechanisms. 
We observe four nested levels of infrastructure within network industries. Each of these 
levels has its own economic dynamics and each makes a contribution to the overall network 
(increasing returns characteristic). These levels are (i) technology standards, (ii) the supply 
chain driven by such standards, (iii) the physical platforms that are the output of the supply 
chains and are the basis from which the company delivers its product (e.g. the digital TV, the 
decoder, the satellite system, and the telephone lines that are the platform from which Sky 
TV delivers its programmes), and (iv) the consumer network (Figure 12.8). The economic 
characteristics of the first three levels are the prevalence of fixed costs and joint products 
coupled with economies of scale. Networks of interacting and interdependent customers 
provide the increasing returns characteristic of networks. Then the whole can have such 
powerful positive feedback characteristics that the winner might be able to take all. 
Each level displays distinctive economic characteristics of significance. Technology stan- 
dards can be achieved either by rule or by emergence and in the latter case early mover 
advantages are important. The economics of modularity and the specialization of knowl- 
edge shape the structure of supply chains. Physical platforms are a melding of standards 
and components in which modularity and the economics of  substitution also play a 
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Figure 12.8 Strategic levels of network industries 
 
significant role. Consumer networks, of course, require positive feedback effects for their full 
power to be gained. We use the mobile telecommunications business as a running example 
to show how these technological dimensions and strategy interact. 
 
12.4.1 Technology and standards 
The significance of the economics of information is attributed to two key factors: the con- 
tinuing reduction in cost of information technology hardware products and the scale effect 
of global standards. Gordon Moore, founder of Intel Corporation, created a corporate 
empire on his eponymous Moore’s Law, which states that every year and a half processing 
power doubles while costs hold constant. Moore’s foresight proved prophetic and ‘Moore’s 
Law’ is expected to remain valid for the foreseeable future (but see Leyden 1997). Computer 
memory, storage capacity and telecommunications bandwidth are all going through a 
similar pattern of cost reduction. This makes it very affordable for individuals and small 
businesses to be equipped with the electronic means to conduct commerce and transfer 
information as fast and freely as large corporations can. Hence, the demand for the products 
of the ICT industries continues to grow.11 
 
11  In spite of the feast and famine evident in the telecommunications industry reminiscent of the fragility 
of corporate structures during the railway boom of the 1840s. 
PREPRINT VERSION 
 
Reference of Published Version 
 
Sammut-Bonnici, T., & McGee, J. (2010). Network Strategy in the Digital Economy. In J. McGee, H. Thomas & D. Wilson (Eds.), Strategy: Analysis 
and Practice (2nd ed., ). UK: Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill. 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER - STRATEGY IN THE NEW ECONOMY  
 
 
However, the rapid growth of products from the ICT economy depends on operating tech- 
nology standards as well as on production costs. For example, automated teller machines 
across the world must work on an agreed standard to ensure customers can use one card in 
different countries. A technology standard is the important enabler to create wide reach and 
to capture a wide network of subscribers. With the globalization of commerce, national and 
regional boundaries blur and the need for international standards is more urgent and critical. 
A new standard can be registered with organizations such as the British Standards 
Institute,  the  American  National  Standards  Institute  or  the  International  Standards 
Organization. But the process to determine the prevailing standard does not stop there. The 
path to achieving a de facto standard stems from three modes of selection process: market- 
based selection, negotiated selection and a hybrid selection process where both market 
competition and negotiation operate jointly. 
Market-based selection is reflected in standards wars such as that between VHS and 
Betamax, where consumers decided on the dominance of the VHS standard. The marketing 
strategies of firms are key to which firm and standard is most likely to win. VHS gained a 
decisive advantage from a strategy of wider distribution channels and a range of comp- 
lementary products (Hollywood films) as well as longer recording time than Betamax, in 
spite of other more advanced features available only on Betamax. 
Negotiated standardization is becoming more widespread. Organizations that determine 
prevailing standards are emerging to reduce the cost and the uncertainty associated with 
adopting new standards. Negotiated standard setting guarantees the smooth interchange of 
information, technical components and services along different networks. The telecommuni- 
cations industry was able to keep up with the speed of technological development by opening 
up the negotiation process to market players (David and Steinmueller 1994; David and 
Shurmer 1996). Groupe Speciale Mobile (GSM), the current mobile technology in Europe, is 
an association of 600 network operators and suppliers of the mobile phone industry. The 
UMTS Forum is a similar association, developed to speed convergence between telecommu- 
nications, IT, media and content suppliers for the 3G industry. As with GSM the name of the 
UMTS association is synonymous with the name for the industry technology standard. 
The internet has a different history of standardization to telecommunications. Standards 
were completely open and established within the research communities of universities. As 
the internet has become a commodity for the domestic and the commercial communities, 
other players are increasingly influencing its evolution. 
Hybrid standard setting emerges as private firms adopt strategies to undercut collabora- 
tive decisions taken in negotiated standardization. They introduce new products, which 
initiate unprecedented developments but also create incompatibilities, lock-in effects, and 
pockets of market power. Internet telephony is a typical example, where companies, stan- 
dards organizations and governments create a hybrid standard setting environment 
(Vercoulen and Wegberg 1998). 
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Case box: Standards versioning 
 
Standards organizations are playing an increasingly important role in the process of 
upgrading standards (called ‘versioning’). The GSM Association is guiding the evolution of the 
mobile industry through a family of wireless technology standards from today’s standard 
through to GPRS, EDGE and 3GSM. Each subsequent standard offers a higher level of service. 
GPRS provides open internet. EDGE facilitates faster data streaming, and 3GSM will provide 
video streaming. The network of companies supporting the technologies will go through 
grades of service levels in order to phase out older standards and introduce new ones (Figure 
12.9). At the end of the life span of a standard the technology platform is decommissioned, 
with the exception of equipment and software that is forward compatible with the next gen- 
eration of standards. 
Software standards follow a similar versioning strategy. Microsoft publishes the Windows 
Desktop Product Lifecycle Guidelines to provide advanced notice of changes in product avail- 
ability and support. Microsoft makes Windows licenses available for purchase for a minimum 
of five years and provides assisted support for a further four years. The guidelines are 
important so that companies can plan their investment through software upgrades of 
Windows 98, NT, 2000, ME, and the latest version of Windows XP. 
Switching costs are minimized when standards are designed to evolve from one another. 
The introduction of revolutionary standards, however, is costly. The pay-off is superior per- 
formance against the high cost of switching standards. The telling example is the price paid 
by mobile telephone operators to switch to third-generation technology. Mobile spectrum 
auctions earned European Governments £200 billion with Britain and Germany raising £22.5 
and £60 billion respectively. The mobile operators had to bid – to renounce third-generation 
spectrum was to opt out of the future (but did they have to pay so much?). The outcome of 
these auctions left mobile operators with increased debt, depleted cash flow, and delay in 
third-generation launches, all of which became the more significant as the stock market fal- 
tered and then stopped dead. 
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Figure 12.9 Standards versioning in the mobile telecommunications industry 
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12.4.2 Supply chain 
In the last twenty years, the structure of the information economy has evolved through the 
interaction of three factors: the increase in computational capacity for data mining; the 
growth of telecommunication networks both fixed and mobile; and the explosion of infor- 
mation sharing via the internet. 
These new, powerful characteristics of information have created opportunities for all 
industries, including network industries, to take advantage of new ways of managing supply 
chains. How to integrate company functions became the key concern and enterprise 
resource planning (ERP) systems provided the solution. Integration of the elements of the 
supply chain was seen as a move to dilute the boundaries of the rigid corporate depart- 
mental structures that were restricting business growth. The ERP era was the first wave of 
change in supply chain management. Deconstruction policies soon followed. Based on the 
example set by the automotive industry, many companies split their business processes and 
pushed some of them out to suppliers. Companies would retain the processes they liked and 
outsource the remainder. The elements of the supply chain would then be controlled 
through proprietary resources, which are difficult to replicate, such as a strong brand 
identity. MMO2, the UK mobile network provider that has recently faced upheaval is decon- 
structing its value chain as a means of strengthening its position (Pesola 2002). The 
company will move all its IT systems, including such functions as customer care, e-payments 
and billing to IBM. The outsourcing agreement covers ten years and is worth £50m in its first 
year. MMO2’s tactics are an interesting pointer of how the European mobile industry is 
changing its operating model in order to emulate the US model. 
With the outsourcing of functions and the need for specialist knowledge in handling elec- 
tronic transactions, the number of organizations involved in the supply chain is increasing. As 
a result of integration and deconstruction, suppliers are developing modular structures with 
Lego-like snap-together interconnectivity. The complexity of the new supply chain structure 
is becoming akin to a business ecosystem of networked co-operation, rather than the tra- 
ditional chain of competing suppliers, manufacturers and distributors (see Mathews 2002). 
Figure 12.10 depicts the modular structure of the ICT industries, which constitute the new 
information economy. The structure is built on layers of communication network 
companies, hardware and software manufacturers, internet service providers, e-commerce 
transaction companies, media and content companies, and myriad service companies. 
The network infrastructure suppliers are companies such as Alcatel, Nortel Networks, 
Motorola and Ericsson that provide communications networking equipment. Intel and 
3Com form a sub-set of companies in this category, which supply interfacing hardware and 
software. 
The network operators provide the basis of the exchange of information between 
companies and their customers. The medium they operate could be based on satellite, tele- 
phone, mobile, television or area networks. British Telecom, AT&T, Vodafone and T-Mobile 
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Figure 12.10 The modular infrastructure of the ICT economy 
 
offer landline and mobile telecommunications networks. The operation of these companies 
is interconnected with other companies. For example, Vodafone uses BT’s network. Credit 
card companies use Vodafone’s mobile network for off-site credit verification. Vodafone has 
sold fixed-line telephone services from Energis and Racal Telecom networks. The interoper- 
ability of different telecom networks has become a complex business operation. British 
Telecom set up BT to develop and manage such relationships. BT Wholesale sells its fixed 
network product to independent service providers: businesses that wish to provide telecom 
services to end consumers without owning their own networks. The independent SP pur- 
chases the network facility from BT and other network operators, adding their own value 
and service brand. 
Satellite networks provide the infrastructure for long-distance television, telephony and 
data interchange transmission. SES GLOBAL, Gilat Satellite Networks and Alcatel 
Space/SkyBridge have formed a 200 million joint venture to provide two-way  
satellite broadband services in corporate and home office markets across Europe. The new 
company plans to cater for the growing demand for broadband communications services 
in Europe via advanced VSAT satellite technology. 
Digital television networks operate on a host of platforms such as satellite, copper or optic 
fibre cable. Interactive television has opened a host of business opportunities for retailing. 
The use of two-way cable networks, or a return medium via a normal telephone line, 
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is changing the way consumers use and respond to television content. The business model 
for this service implies a new form of supply chain, for a new form of retailing. 
Internet service providers are part of a complex web that provides the supply chain of 
information to the internet user. ISPs such as AOL and Fastnet convey internet content over 
the infrastructure of the telecommunication companies. At the back-end of the supply web, 
ISPs receive web pages from various organizations. The owners of the web pages would be 
the media and content suppliers, or, in many cases, they may have purchased the services of 
the media and content suppliers to create their web presence. At the front-end, where the 
supply web touches the customer, ISPs have to collaborate or conform to consumer interface 
manufacturers, which in the internet scenario would be computer suppliers. The supply web 
for the internet is due for another major revolution with third-generation (3G) mobile com- 
munication, which carries high-speed internet and video streaming. The 3G telephone, 
which will become the new customer interface, could dictate a change in internet transmis- 
sion management and the nature of media content all the way down the supply chain. 
The supply chain in the information economy shown in Figure 12.10 takes the form of a 
weblike network where each member may have to collaborate with many other members. 
Intercollaboration is possible because of software and hardware compatibility, and necessary 
because of the high degree of knowledge specialization at each point on the supply chain. 
An example of this weblike structure is the relationship between e-transaction companies, 
ISPs and media content providers and the companies that own the web pages. The four types 
of organization have to ensure the compatibility of their services across the supply network. 
The infrastructure of the information economy does not look like a normal, traditional 
and competitive supply chain in the ‘old’ industrial economy. Telephony and the internet 
have made it possible for corporations to have commercial partnerships with many more 
companies. The notion of ‘information is power’ is turned on its head. As more companies 
have  access  to  more  information  through  communication,  power  is  dissipated  to  more 
members in the supply chain. This increase in information exchange has become the over- 
riding equalizer of power throughout the supply networks. 
The basis of this new economy is the increase in connectivity among the various players in 
the chain. The connectivity level itself is rapidly evolving as communication and computa- 
tional technologies become faster. The whole supply network is in a state of flux. Flexibility 
and adaptability have become essential strategic stances. Faster connectivity within the 
supply chain not only implies more interconnections between companies, but it also creates 
more volatile and replaceable interrelationships. 
The concept of replaceable interrelationships has come about because companies are 
becoming ‘isomorphic’ or similar in nature. DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 149), drawing 
from Hawley (1968), define isomorphism as ‘a constraining process that forces one unit in 
a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions’. 
With the standardization of technology, products are becoming more similar in design and 
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quality. With the standardization of internal operations, through materials resource plan- 
ning (MRP), enterprise resource planning (ERP) and electronic customer relationship 
management (eCRM), the service levels of competing companies are becoming similar in 
content and in construction. The implication is that suppliers are easily replaced with 
similar companies that have similar products and similar delivery attributes. 
The information economy is creating a web of companies that have lower barriers of entry 
but fewer safety nets for retaining business. The older, hierarchical value chains of the indus- 
trial economy reinforced exclusivity, while the information economy is more inclusive. 
 
Case box: The rise of co-evolution and co-operation 
 
The new weblike value chain gives rise to a ‘self-organizing’ system. In nature, flocking is a 
form of self-organization. The formation of flocking birds is a self-organizing form of collab- 
oration, with simple goals of direction and velocity. Similarly, companies organize and adapt 
their relationships with vendors and distributors. They select and substitute their partners in 
the value chain according to changes in the consumer market. Vendors and distributors in 
turn adapt to new market scenarios. For example, a wave of collaborative buying (when com- 
petitors join forces for purchasing) is counteracted by a wave of collaborative vending from 
vendors. The system eventually normalizes the balance of power. 
The ‘self-organizing’ aspect in the information economy leads to the concept of ‘co- 
evolution’ (see Kelly, 1994, for an overview of the implications of adaptive behaviour). 
Evolving to meet the needs of other members in the value chain is becoming a more effective 
strategy than satisfying the company’s own needs. Adapting to meet other companies’ need 
leads to more business. Riding the new wave of co-evolution, companies are avoiding costly 
races against each other in favour of a strategy to join forces to gain more customers. We are 
observing this effect in NEC and Siemens, which have joined forces to supply the networks for 
Hutchison 3G, a key network provider of third-generation telecommunications in Europe. 
Co-evolution and collaboration are even more relevant in industries where network exter- 
nalities are a vital part of corporate success. The more customers join a network, such as a 
telecommunications service, the higher is the incentive for other customers to join. This effect 
is causing companies to collaborate on issues of compatibility. With 3G mobile phones on the 
horizon for Europe and the US, the standards war for a mobile internet operating system has 
begun. Microsoft, Linux, Symbian and Openwave are in the race to establish a widely 
accepted standard. This is an example of old-style competition, but it has caused a wave of 
co-evolution in another layer of competitors. The issue of standards has motivated Nokia and 
Siemens, Europe’s largest manufacturers of mobile phones, to collaborate. They have teamed 
up to accelerate the introduction of third-generation mobile services. The collaboration of two 
companies will guarantee that Nokia and Siemens handsets can communicate with each other 
seamlessly. In this way the two companies, which have a combined global market share of 45 
per cent, will benefit from network externalities and the positive feedback generated from 
providing a larger compatible technology network. Nokia and Siemens anticipate that other 
equipment vendors will link up with them to minimize industry fragmentation. 
PREPRINT VERSION 
 
Reference of Published Version 
 
Sammut-Bonnici, T., & McGee, J. (2010). Network Strategy in the Digital Economy. In J. McGee, H. Thomas & D. Wilson (Eds.), Strategy: Analysis 
and Practice (2nd ed., ). UK: Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill. 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER - STRATEGY IN THE NEW ECONOMY  
 
 
12.4.3 Physical platforms 
A physical platform is the tangible infrastructure (such as computers, telephones, satellites, 
digital TV and local area networks) that delivers a service to consumers. A simple example 
of a platform is the PC on your desk. This comprises a set of hardware and software items 
joined together to provide a computing service. The component items are built according to 
to explicit technology standards and are delivered through separate but parallel supply 
chains to the PC assembler. Similarly, to obtain Sky’s pay-TV service one needs a physical 
platform consisting of digital TV receiver, set-top decoder, telephone landlines, satellites and 
ground stations. The physical platform is an assembly of items, each constructed to specific 
standards and integrated to deliver service to the customer. 
 
Case box: Globalstar 
 
Globalstar is another example of a physical platform. Globalstar provides mobile telecommu- 
nications using Low Earth Orbiting (LEO) satellites. Its telephones look like mobile or fixed 
phones but the difference is that they can operate in areas outside normal reach. The satel- 
lite platform picks up signals from the Earth’s surface, and relays them to the terrestrial 
gateway. Gateways distribute the calls to existing fixed and mobile networks. Terrestrial 
gateways are vital to integrate the company’s services with existing local telephony net- 
works. 
The size of a physical network does not guarantee success. Iridium had a larger physical 
platform of satellites than Globalstar, but faced marketing-related difficulties at start-up. 
When it launched in 1998 it targeted the consumer users, who rejected the service because 
of its cost and bulky first-generation phones. Iridium filed for bankruptcy in 2001 and planned 
to decommission its satellite platform. It was purchased by a consortium, which paid $25 
million for the inactive satellite system, which cost $5 billion when it was built in 1998. 
Iridium has recuperated most of its losses by changing its marketing segmentation strategy. 
Its current major user is the US Department of Defence, which is in line with its sales strategy 
to service large industrial users in remote locations (Weiss 2001). 
 
Physical platforms have evolved from the simple structures, such as the older regional 
railway system, to a complex structure of interconnected sub-platforms. For this reason, the 
joints between the sub-networks become the strength of the whole structure, or, conversely, 
it could be its Achilles heel. It is therefore vital to define standards for joints. The standards 
that govern how a system and its modules interact is called the network’s architecture 
(Morris and Ferguson 1993). 
Henderson and Clark (1990) review two kinds of dynamic processes in modular systems: 
modular innovation and architectural innovation. The former type retains the architec- 
ture of the network, including its joints, but modifies the modules. By preserving the basic 
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architecture of a system, network providers offer users enough compatibility to shift from 
one product generation to the next. The changes occur in the innovations and improve- 
ments of the modular components. They are be fitted into the system when required, and 
will be removed when obsolete. The result is a hybrid dynamic of change that preserved 
the platform’s architecture while creating innovations within the module structure. A series 
of minor incremental modular changes can lead to an overall network platform that is rad- 
ically new (Vercoulen and Wegberg 1998). 
In architectural innovation, the modules are largely unchanged, but the architecture that 
connects them (the jointing system) is changed (Henderson and Clark 1990). The speed of 
innovation can be fast, as a key part of the system, the modular structure, is retained. New 
joints between these modules are installed. In some cases, adopting new standards and 
installing some new modules that embody these standards create an architectural inno- 
vation. The development of the internet in the late 1990s is an example of an architectural 
innovation in a network platform. The main proponents of the internet evolution are 
standard-setting bodies such as the World Wide Web Consortium and the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (Vercoulen and Wegberg 1998). 
 
Case box: Managing interoperability 
 
Physical platforms in the telecommunications industry are typically open platforms (like 
Wintel is for PCs) that provide interconnectivity with other telecom networks to add value 
and create network externalities. Open platforms have stipulated protocols, which are imple- 
mented by a large user base, as in the case of IBM clones. Closed platforms or proprietary 
platforms make it difficult for others to interact properly with those systems. Microsoft soft- 
ware and Apple computers are examples of closed platforms. 
Open networks require interconnections and compatibility with surrounding networks. 
Telecommunications platforms have had to cope with the complexity of interoperability 
among different systems, as well as the agility required to shift rapidly to newer standards. 
The dynamics of complexity and agility used to be opposing forces (Vercoulen and Wegberg 
1998). A complex interconnected physical platform tends to develop slowly. Railway systems 
and the telecom networks in many countries show this inertia. Communications and tech- 
nology firms progressively created a solution to these opposing dynamics of development. As 
in the supply chain case discussed earlier, companies divided their platform structure into sep- 
arate modules, each with some degree of autonomy (Langlois and Robertson 1992; Garud, 
Kumaraswamy and Prabhu 1995). Each module is designed with the flexibility for rapid 
change, such as the shift from ETACS to GSM. The complexity feature is retained because 
each module is interoperable with other modules to form a weblike complex system. The 
modules are therefore interdependent through the nodes, or joints between the modules. 
Interoperability between modules creates value for the user, as we observe in the ability to 
call overseas on a mobile telephone. Roaming of mobile telephones from country to country is 
another example. Interoperability exists between platforms of different network providers in 
the same country, or different platforms in different countries. 
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Building alliances 
The reach of a technical platform determines the size of the consumer base. For this 
reason, companies are building alliances to gain the rewards of positive feedback. Apple 
and Microsoft have collaborated to create a version of Office that operates on an Apple 
computer. The effect is to allow the Apple computer platform to overlap with  the 
Microsoft Office platform. In the mobile industry, competing telephone manufacturers 
are clamouring to create a communications platform with a common operating system. 
Ericsson and Nokia use the Symbian operating system on their third-generation mobile 
phones. Panasonic and Motorola are planning to introduce telephones with the software 
platform. Symbian will receive a total of $17.95 million in funding from Nokia Corp., 
Motorola Inc., Panasonic, Sony Ericsson and Psion to support its development (Evers 
2002). 
The Ethernet is an earlier example of alliance formation intended to increase the size of a 
physical platform. In 1973 Metcalfe and Boggs invented the Ethernet, the local area net- 
working (LAN) technology that acts as a means to send vast amounts of data at high speed 
to the laser printers that Xerox was designing. Interestingly, the Ethernet came before the PC, 
yet it was to create a breakthrough in computer  networking  that  would  eventually  tie 
together over 50 million PCs worldwide. The Ethernet quickly attracted Digital and Intel’s 
interest to adopt the communication platform. Metcalfe had moved on to form 3Com but 
remained the key player in the discussions between Xerox, Digital and Intel. The DI3X group 
was formed, named after the first letter of the company names. The alliance lobbied for 
Ethernet to become a standard approved by the IEEE. Xerox agreed to license Ethernet to all 
users at a nominal fee of $1000. It realized that it would have to provide an open standard 
to get computer manufacturers to take on Ethernet as an interface to their printers. The 
strength of Ethernet was that it allowed PCs and workstations from different manufacturers 
to communicate by using an agreed standard, hence increasing the size of its physical plat- 
form and therefore its reach. 
12.4.4 Consumer networks 
A  consumer  network  requires  interdependencies  between  consumers.  In  a   consumer 
market there are two levels of value attached to a product. ‘Autarky’ value (Liebowitz and 
Margolis  1999)  refers  to  the  value  associated  with  a  product  irrespective  of  the  number 
of other users. In marketing terms, this would be the ‘core’ value of a product. In econ- 
omics this is the normal assumption  and  the  theory  of  the  firm  is  based  on  assumptions 
about the  independence  of  individual  consumer  preferences.  ‘Synchronization’  value  is 
the augmented value  derived  from  being  able  to  interact  with  other  consumers. The  latter 
fuels the  dynamics  of  the  network  effect  discussed  earlier  in  this  chapter  and  in  McGee 
and Sammut-Bonnici (2002). For  example,  the  relative  abilities  of  Microsoft,  Symbian  or 
other  companies  to  capture  synchronization  value  will  determine  who  will  gain  critical 
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mass first and win the race to establish the new operating system for third-generation 
mobile telephones. Customers will buy the 3G phones with the operating system they 
expect to be the most popular in the future. In this way they will be able to communi- 
cate and exchange video clips and photos with the widest possible set of users. The 
success of the winning operating system might depend on the psychology of consumer 
choice, or it could depend on technology characteristics from supply chain strategies and 
technology standards. For example, Microsoft and Intel co-operated to make Windows 95 
exclusively compatible with Intel x86 microprocessor architectures and vice versa. The 
media coined the effect the ‘Wintel Advantage’. In the case of mobile operating systems, 
Symbian and Microsoft are rallying their respective set of supporters to establish separate 
supply networks. 
 
Lock-in and switching costs 
The Wintel case led to a situation of lock-in for Windows users. The Wintel operating 
system quickly gained critical mass through rapid adoption and it became the most 
popular system throughout the world. On top of this, Windows users then invested in 
complementary software such as the Microsoft Office suite. Lock-in arises whenever users 
invest in the multiple complementary and durable assets of a physical platform and then 
find the costs of switching to an alternative to be prohibitive. Lock-in can occur on an 
individual level, company level and even a societal level. Thus, individuals may face 
switching costs in adopting a rival to Microsoft software, but so also do companies in 
having to provide systematic retraining costs, and so might whole communities in having 
to move from one software product to another. The key is that it would usually be 
necessary to switch from one dominant product to retain the interdependencies and com- 
plementarities between consumers. Private users were locked into the long-playing record 
technology because records could not be used on CD players (but were persuaded to 
switch when the benefit–cost ratio of the new products became sufficiently large). Note 
that the benefits of tape recording were never large enough to persuade customers to make 
a wholesale switch from LPs but the extra benefits of tapes (ability to record) were suffi- 
cient to persuade customers to invest in parallel systems. Companies became locked into 
Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheets because their employees were trained in using the program 
command structure but later were persuaded to switch to Excel within Microsoft Office 
because of the extra complementarities. On a societal level, millions of users throughout 
the world are locked into using Microsoft’s Windows desktop operating environment, as it 
has become the standard software in offices around the world. 
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Case box: Lock-in and switching costs in mobile communications 
 
Telecommunication systems providers have chosen to offer new, superior technologies 
despite high switching costs. The industry has undergone three generations of technologies – 
TACS, ETACS, and GSM – and is now in the early days of introduction of 3G, incurring signifi- 
cant investment costs. Their calculation is made on the basis that the new systems will 
provide backward compatibility plus the expected benefits of new services. 
Switching costs and lock-in at the consumer level can be deliberately used to inhibit or 
prevent consumers from adopting newer technologies or moving to alternative networks. In 
mobile communications, users may switch to another network provider with the same tech- 
nology but with a different price structure. They may choose to switch to another technology 
when they replace their handsets with higher-level models. The strategies of the mobile 
telecommunication companies have focused on manipulating the tangible and intangible con- 
sumer costs when switching networks. In the introductory phase customers were 
contractually bound to a network for a year. They had to pay a release fee to end the con- 
tract and a connection charge to go to the next network. In the later 1990s switching 
networks became easier with the introduction of pay-as-you-go cards. But the hidden, intan- 
gible costs of switching remains, irrespective of payment structures and Oftel’s recent 
pressure to minimize switching cost in the industry. Customers are deterred from switching 
by the investment in the time required to get used to a new product and are further inhibited 
by the uncertainty about the quality of untested products. The influence of brand loyalty is 
also significant. To the consumer, another very relevant switching cost is the loss of the 
mobile number when moving to another network (this was also a very big issue in the devel- 
opment of the telephone system in the USA over a century ago). Subscribers’ reluctance to 
give up their familiar numbers resulted in the introduction of subsidized phones and more 
competitive tariffs. The power of switching costs can be observed in the entry strategies 
against powerful incumbents. Vodafone and Cellnet started to operate in 1984 and had a 
captive customer base by the time Orange and One2One entered the market in 1993 and 1994 
respectively. The new entrants had to generate new customer-winning strategies with 
stronger branding and lower costs. 
 
 
On a societal level economists observe that the practice of using lock-in strategies can 
have negative welfare effects as new superior technologies are suppressed. Liebowitz and 
Margolis (1990) discuss the fascinating example of typewriter keyboard layouts. In the 
1870s the QWERTY configuration was selected by the creators of the TypeWriter brand in 
order to slow down typists in order to reduce jamming of the keys. The Dvorak layout 
patented in the 1932 is a more efficient layout and allows faster typing. This would suggest 
that QWERTY should then give way to the more efficient keyboard layout. The phenom- 
enon of sticking to the slower QWERTY system is explained in terms of switching costs. 
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The collective switching costs are far higher than the individual switching costs because the 
co-ordination for mass switching to Dvorak is so difficult. With the advent of electric type- 
writers if the 1950s and then computer keyboards the expectation is even stronger but 
QWERTY still remains. 
 
 
12.5 Networks, standards and competition 
According to Economides and Flyer (1997): 
Firms that compete in markets where network externalities are present face unique 
trade-offs regarding the choice of a technical standard. Adhering to a leading com- 
patibility standard allows a firm’s product to capture the value added by a large 
network. However, simultaneously the firm loses direct control over the market 
supply of the good and faces (direct) intra-platform competition. Alternatively, 
adhering to a unique standard allows the firm to face less or no intra-platform 
competition, but it sacrifices the added value associated with a large network. 
This trade-off is a key strategic decision that depends in part on the control that firms have 
in making their output compatible with competitors’ outputs and complementary products. 
The ability to conform to a common standard opens the opportunity to make this trade-off. 
Where standards are proprietary, the decision rests with the owner of the standard. The 
owner’s trade-off is the pay-off associated with developing the existing network and its 
spillovers versus the introduction of more intra-platform competition. Essentially the trade- 
off is the same: to adhere to a common standard or to seek uniqueness. This can be 
expressed as a sequential game: at the outset, one chooses the appropriate technical standard 
(and, therefore, the network to join), and later one chooses how to compete. Normal 
markets do not have this choice of network and there are consequences for market structure 
and competition in the presence of network externalities. The mathematical model in 
Economides and Flyer (1997) defines networks as coalition structures and analyses the stab- 
ility of coalitions under different standards regimes and varying levels of network 
externalities. There are a number of implications for market structure in the presence of 
network externalities. 
First, it is intuitively clear that industry output will be higher when there are network 
externalities and when standards are open. Firms are free to choose which standard to adopt 
and are deterred only by the costs of adoption. Second, when standards are incompatible 
and the owners of standards can exercise proprietary control, incumbents are more strongly 
protected against the consequences of new entrants. Moreover, there will usually be con- 
siderable asymmetries between firms in terms of outputs, prices and profits. (Under 
incompatibility regimes, firms are equivalent to platforms and constitute one-firm net- 
works.) For pure network goods the asymmetries are particularly marked. 
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In general, with total incompatibility of standards market concentration, output 
inequality and price and profit inequality increase with the extent of the network externality. 
This is an important result because it explains why one or two firms so often dominate 
network industries. The mechanism is straightforward. The leading network establishes its 
critical mass, leaving the second network to establish a critical mass across the remaining 
untapped market coverage. The third network follows in the same fashion and so on. It 
follows that there will be a tendency to provide large incentives to organize customers into 
few platforms so as to maximize the added value from the available networks. Firms will be 
keen to abandon their own weak standards in favour of the higher value obtainable from a 
leading network. 
There is a third implication. Where there are proprietary standards and strong network 
effects, there is no natural equilibrium in terms of network offerings. There are always incen- 
tives for at least one firm to move to a stronger network and the consequence of any one 
move is to shift the incentives for all other firms. However, equilibrium can be reinforced by 
the refusal of firms to make their proprietary standards available. Again, the mechanism is 
straightforward. Under strong externalities, the owner of a standard has a considerable 
incentive to exploit the standard by itself and to exclude other firms with weaker standards. 
Conversely, where the externality is weak, the owner will find a stronger incentive to admit 
other firms to its proprietary standard in order to grow the network through collective effort 
and thus generate more added value. 
In summary, strong network externalities suggest the following conclusions: 
1 Larger industry output. 
2 Very large asymmetries between firms/platforms. 
3 Likelihood of market dominance. 
4 Enhancement and protection of proprietary standards. 
5 Equilibrium market structures that are the reverse of the world without network exter- 
nalities. 
 
 
12.6 Implications for strategy 
This chapter argues that there are major differences between the economic and strategic 
characteristics of the new economy compared to the old industrial order. These major dif- 
ferences can be summarized as follows: 
1 The information economy depends on connectivity. Without connectivity, consumer 
interdependence is indirect. Positive feedback gives an economic law of plenty – more 
gives more. 
2 Upfront  costs  are  very  large  and  revenues  can  be  substantially  delayed  and  are 
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significantly at risk. As a result, the nature of business models is different, with higher 
degrees of risk embedded in them. 
3 It is also a world of immense uncertainty where even the range of potential outcomes is 
not known, but also where there is a significant probability that future technological 
change might undermine an apparently winning position. 
4 The competition between rival networks/standards can be hard to call in advance. 
5 ‘Tippy markets’ substantially raise the level of risk. 
In this new world there is much more uncertainty and companies need to take bigger risks 
in order just to survive. The prospect of entrepreneurial profits is enticingly large but there 
are probably greater probabilities of failure. The list of failures and near failures in the last 
decade by large companies is very long. There are some new strategic ‘rules’ for competing 
in the new economy. While these are quite generic in nature they illustrate that companies 
need to come to these markets with a different mindset about how to compete: 
1 Expectations management is central to the way in which marketing strategy is conceived 
(see the case box below). 
2 Open standards are the key to volume. Protected standards are only viable as small high- 
priced niche markets. The old preoccupation with protection of intellectual property is 
giving way to a sharing and co-operating approach. 
3 There is a law of inverse pricing. The best (i.e. the most valuable in the future) products 
are given away, such as web browsers, in order to create a consumer standard, and sheer 
volume causes both marginal costs and prices to fall over time as the product becomes 
more valuable. The cash flow machine consists of modest (even small) margins multi- 
plied by gigantic volumes to defray massive investments. The machine is volume driven 
and protected by very large switching costs. 
4 The first strategic choice is which network to join (which standard to adopt). The second, 
and a long way behind, is how to compete within the network of choice. 
5 Networked complementarities and co-operative strategies are replacing the old order of 
hierarchical business organization and competition. 
6 In a world of uncertainty, customers are also uncertain about which standards, tech- 
nologies and products will prevail. This will increase the power of brands and place upon 
marketing the need to manage customer expectations so as to speed adoption rates 
towards tipping points in the market. 
The economic characteristics of network industries are dependent in large part on the inter- 
connectivity that is characteristic of the technologies of information goods. 
Interconnectivity allows customers to view, use and link products, giving rise to virtual 
networks  of  customers.  In  these  networks,  powerful  demand-side  increasing  returns 
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can operate. Where consumer-based externalities are powerful there are strong pressures 
towards ‘winner takes all’ phenomena (e.g. Wintel globally, and Sky TV in the UK). In these 
circumstances conventional economic laws are challenged. De facto monopoly can emerge: 
but uncertainty is high and markets may be intrinsically unstable. Successive waves of tech- 
nology may outmode old monopolies and serve as the basis for new monopolies. 
The rate of growth and now the sheer size of the ICT industry has been the progenitor of 
major changes in the economy. We have seen major effects on other industries through the 
new value possibilities that information technology offers and through the substantial fixed 
costs and minimum scales required for effective deployment of these technologies. When 
linked to networks of interdependent customers we see the potential emergence of ‘winner 
takes all’ strategies and the emergence of new monopolies. 
We have decomposed the ICT industry into its component parts in order to see who the 
players are and how they interact with one another. In doing this we argue that we are begin- 
ning to see a new type of industrial order – one marked by networked complementarities 
and co-operation in place of the traditional model of hierarchy and competition. We have 
also decomposed the industry into four horizontal levels – technology, supply chain, plat- 
form, and network – to show that these have different economic characteristics and 
therefore that corporate strategies have different dynamics. The examples quoted indicate 
the range and extent of the possibilities inherent in the new technologies and for the nature 
of rivalry in the form of pre-emptive strikes and technology races. We note particularly the 
pervasive changes that are taking place in supply chains generally. The increasing import- 
ance of connectivity and modularity is forcing a shift from competitive mode towards 
co-operative mode. This raises thoughts of self-organizing systems and the notion of co- 
evolution, rather a long way from the search for and exercise of crude bargaining power. The 
sheer size and cost of physical platforms also create new dynamics. The pervasive use of 
alliances is an obvious example. Less obvious is how the need for interoperability requires 
new attitudes towards complexity and requirements for agility. 
A new set of strategies is emerging to offset the risks and pressures exerted by these rules. 
This is visible in the setting up of global standards and their ensuing platforms. For example, 
Group Speciale Mobile, commonly known as GSM, is an association of 600 network opera- 
tors and suppliers of the mobile phone industry. Their primary objective is to set a common 
standard for mobile communications in order to create a homogeneous industry where 
equipment, software and networks can seamlessly talk to each other. Strategies of standard- 
ization are stabilizing the markets and charting the course for research and development 
policies. 
Finally, we remark on the significance of interdependence between consumers. This effect 
at its strongest completely shifts our thinking from the prevalence of oligopolistic competi- 
tion (size matters but so do diminishing returns) to the possibility of winner takes all and 
the monopoly (size matters – full stop). Clearly such network effects are not always going to 
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be so extreme but there is a real possibility that the combination of high fixed costs, signifi- 
cant economies of scale, and high degrees of knowledge specialization will, when taken 
together with consumer bandwagons, create massive new corporate structures to which the 
major (and perhaps only) discipline will be further developments in technology. However, 
the analysis of consumer lock-in suggests the real possibility that switching costs might 
inhibit the adoption of valuable new technologies. 
 
 
Case box: Expectations management 
 
When consumers choose products in network markets, their expectations play a crucial role 
on sales of the products or their network components, since consumer utility depends on the 
number of other consumers purchasing the same products. Rival firms in the network industry 
influence consumers’ expectations in order to maximize their profits. The process is facilitated 
by consumers’ imperfect information about the size of the installed base in the market. Sales 
figures are often exaggerated to impress consumers about leadership in the installed base 
over rivals. The competition between OS/2 and Microsoft Windows in 1992 is an example of 
firms’ intentions of influencing consumer expectation. IBM and Microsoft both announced 
wider adoption of their operating systems than actual. Later on, each company disputed the 
estimated numbers of sales of the other (Bensen and Farrell 1994). 
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Figure 12.11  Adoption processes: networks and technologies 
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Figure 12.12 Managing the adoption process 
were significant. The mobile company that was expected to grow the fastest would gain most 
market share. Self-fulfilling expectations are one manifestation of positive feedback econ- 
omics and bandwagon effects. The mobile industry has made consistent use of semiotics in 
expectations management through its media campaigns. Images, music themes and slogans 
are used to imply magnitude and leadership. 
The model in Figure 12.11 illustrates the adoption process. Adoption typically follows an 
S-shaped pattern around the long-term trend growth rate. The early adopters (‘anoraks’) 
rush in. There is then a pause while the prospective early adopters make up their minds – 
marketing is focused on persuading them to move quickly and decisively so as to create a 
rapid growth that will become self-sustaining (through point B in the diagram). Following 
this, the push to sustain the market through attracting late adopters is the next marketing 
focus. This suggests some rules for marketing – these are summarized in Figure 12.12. 
Marketing is about creating momentum so as to minimize the risks that are endemic in this 
new world. Brands and reputation are, if anything, even more important. The emphasis is 
on volume, so open standards are attractive and low, penetration-style pricing will be 
common. 
Vodafone’s corporate image campaign in its early days included images of the Thames 
Barrier and the cliffs of Dover. Symbols of national interest were used to give the subliminal 
message that Vodafone will succeed throughout the UK. The musical theme in the Thames 
Barrier campaign was from Close Encounters, implying universal reach. The cliffs of Dover 
campaign involved the draping of a large section of the cliffs with material, by a contem- 
porary artist. The message could have been directed at conquering ‘coverage’ issues of radio 
transmission. Orange has had one of the most famous slogans in UK media history: ‘The future 
is bright, the future is Orange’. One2One has had equally expansionist media campaigns, par- 
ticularly with its award-winning ‘Welcome to Our World’. All these campaigns imply market 
leadership and a sense of network growth. 
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The effects in Figure 12.11 can be seen in research by Huberman (1988), which shows how 
consumers’ expectations are being linked to the critical mass. The stronger the consumers’ 
expectation that a new network will be widely adopted in the future, the faster the market 
reaches critical mass. Once a critical number of users is achieved, the rate of increase of new 
users increases exponentially, up to the limit of the user population (or to some other natural 
limit; see Figure 12.11). The implication for strategists it that the time required to achieve 
critical mass can be reduced in proportion to the degree of optimism of people’s expectations. 
Hence, strategic action aimed at increasing consumers’ expectations of the success of a new 
product would have a double effect of inducing more new users, who in turn influence even 
more users. This effect can be powerful – Huberman’s simulations demonstrate that even if 
there is only a small group of individuals with double the propensity for innovation in relation 
to the group average, the critical mass can be reached very rapidly. This has been evident in 
the mobile telecommunications industry. Once the phones were affordable and accessible to 
the youth market (the early adopters), sales boomed for this particular segment. As a result 
even more users from other segments were attracted to the market. 
 
 
 
12.7  Summary 
 
Thus, the brave new world has a sting in the tail. The pervasive development of the ICT 
industries has promoted, and continues to promote, very substantial consequential 
changes throughout the economy. In doing so, industry economics and dynamics do 
change and significant adaptations have to take place in order to avoid getting run down 
by the juggernaut. Changes are needed in the nature of the corporate strategies and in 
the mindsets required. Where the conjunction of certain technological and consumer 
circumstances takes place, the strategy game becomes a very direct race to establish 
dominant position. Even where such games fail to achieve their objectives, the cost of 
unproductive investment could be enormous. Where they in fact succeed, many will 
nevertheless have failed, and we would also face the difficulties in managing the conse- 
quences of de facto monopoly. The data available does not suggest that winner takes all 
is likely to be a frequent phenomenon. However, all the other indications suggest that 
various forms of scale-intensive,  pre-emptive strategies will become much more 
common (see, for example, the telecommunications boom and bust). But as a counter- 
point we can also see that there are very considerable forces promoting more co-
operation and stronger incentives towards a much more subtle blending of co- 
operative and competitive modes of practice within industries. 
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Recap questions and assignments 
 
1 Explain how network externalities might (or might not) occur in the following situ- 
ations, paying particular attention to the way in which critical mass is reached: 
(a) The Apple–IBM PC battle in the PC industry; 
(b) The mobile telecommunications industry; 
(c) BSkyB and the satellite TV market. 
2 For the situations in question 1, give examples of co-evolution and/or cooperation. 
In which case is co-operative behaviour most marked? Why? 
3 For any internet-based business with which you are familiar, explain its business 
model and compare it to any one of the business models discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When you have read this chapter, log on to the Online Learning Centre website at 
www.mcgraw-hill.co.uk/textbooks/mcgee to explore chapter-by-chapter test questions, 
further reading and more online study tools for strategy. 
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Case 1  How good is Google? 
If the ultimate measure of impact is to have one’s name become a new verb in the world’s 
main languages, Google has reason to be proud. When they founded the company five 
years ago, Sergey Brin and Larry Page, friends at Stanford University, chose a word play on 
‘googol’ – the number 1 followed by 100 zeros – because their ambition was to organize 
the information overload of the internet in a transparent and superior way. These days, 
singles ‘google’ suitors before agreeing to a date, housewives ‘google’ recipes  before 
cooking, and patients ‘google’ their ailments before visiting doctors. Dave Gorman, a com- 
edian, even has a popular show, the ‘Googlewhack Adventure’ – a Googlewhack being what 
happens when two words are entered into Google and it comes back with exactly one 
match. 
As search engines go, in other words, Google has clearly been a runaway success. Not only 
is its own site the most popular for search on the web, but it also powers the search engines 
of major portals, such as Yahoo! and AOL. All told, 75% of referrals to websites now origi- 
nate from Google’s algorithms. That is power. For some time now, Google’s board (which 
includes two of Silicon Valley’s best-known venture capitalists, John Doerr of Kleiner 
Perkins Caufield & Byers and Michael Moritz of Sequoia Capital) has been deliberating how 
to translate that power into money. They appear to have decided to bring Google to the 
stockmarket next spring. Bankers have been overheard estimating Google’s value at $15 
billion or more. That could make Google Silicon Valley’s first hot IPO since the dotcom bust, 
and perhaps its biggest ever. That alone is enough to have some sceptics whispering 
‘Netscape’. Now that the worst of the dotcom hangover is clearing, they wonder, will Google 
become one of the few valuable internet survivors, joining Amazon and above all eBay? Or 
will it simply be the next over-hyped share sale to make its founders rich only to wither away 
miserably, either for lack of a sustainably profitable business model, or, like Netscape, 
because it finds itself in the path of that mighty wrecker, Microsoft? 
 
The search for profits 
Google, naturally, is determined to avoid Netscape’s fate at all costs. This was why it made 
Eric Schmidt its chief executive in 2001. Mr Schmidt was 46 at the time – Messrs Brin and 
Page were in their twenties – and was the boss of Novell, a software firm decimated by 
Microsoft but given another lease of life under his leadership. He seemed suitably ‘adult’ to 
turn Google into a money-making machine. 
Mr Schmidt understood that the key to monetising all those customer searches (now 200m 
a day) was to place small, unobtrusive and highly relevant text advertisements alongside 
Google’s search results. Advertisers like this system because they pay only if web surfers actu- 
ally click on their links. And consumers either do not mind, or even learn to love these 
commercial links for their relevance, just as they appreciate the Yellow Pages. 
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Google did not pioneer this ‘paid search’ advertising. That honour falls to Overture, a 
Californian firm bought this year by Yahoo! which still has about half of the $2 billion-or- 
so market. Nor did Google’s founders readily embrace the concept. Mr Page was once heard 
to say at a trade show that commercial exploitation was ‘bastardising’ the search industry. 
Mr Schmidt made the concept uncontroversial at Google,  thereby  helping  paid  search  to 
become the fastest growing part of  the advertising industry today. 
The next step is to take this approach to advertising from the results pages of search 
engines and on to other web pages. Increasingly, web publishers – from hobby bloggers to 
small businesses – allow firms such as Google to crawl through the content of their pages 
and place relevant text advertisements in the right margin. Once page visitors click on the 
links, the webmasters share the revenues with Google. At a stroke, this so-called ‘contextual 
advertising’ makes much of web publishing self-financing. This may result in better web 
content by making hitherto unprofitable online activities economically viable. 
Meta Group, a consultancy, reckons that the market for paid search and other contextual 
advertising will grow to $5 billion by 2006. This is Google’s main market opportunity 
(although it also gets some revenues from licensing its search technology). Currently, Google 
is thought to make annual profits of about $150m. To be worth the rumoured $15 billion 
for longer than it takes a bubble to burst, it will need to raise its profitability substantially. 
That means matching such internet stars as eBay (market capitalisation $37 billion), but 
without the natural-monopoly advantages that have made eBay so dominant – the classic 
network effect of buyers and sellers knowing they do best by all trading in one place. For 
Google to stay permanently ahead of other search-engine technologies is almost impossible, 
since it takes so little – only a bright idea by another set of geeks – to lose the lead. In con- 
trast to a portal such as Yahoo!, which also offers customers free e-mail and other services, a 
pure search engine is always but a click away from losing users. 
 
The arrival of competitors 
Yahoo!, in fact, will probably be the first to attack. It now owns rival search technologies 
including AltaVista, AlltheWeb and Inktomi. With the contextual-advertising technology of 
Overture, Yahoo! now has under its own roof all the elements of the business model that 
made Google such a success. It cannot be long before Yahoo! turns from a lucrative customer 
of Google’s into a powerful rival. 
Even more frightening (especially to those who remember Netscape’s fate in the browser 
wars), Microsoft smells blood. It is currently working on its own search algorithm, which it 
hopes to make public early next year, around the probable time of Google’s share listing. 
Historically, Microsoft has been good at letting others (Apple, Netscape, Real) pioneer a 
technology before taking over, exploiting its dominance in desktop operating systems. 
Google the new-age advertising agency makes money, but it is Google the search engine 
that builds the consumer brand which makes the ad agency powerful. Whenever users click 
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on advertisements on Google’s own site, Google gets all the revenues. Whenever users stray 
to other search engines, even ones where Google has placed sponsored links, Google has to 
share the revenues with the site owner. As the competition between Google, Overture and 
others heats up, Google’s profit margins will fall. 
This may already be happening. Craig Pisaris-Henderson, the chief executive of 
FindWhat.com, a smaller rival to Overture and Google in contextual advertising, reckons 
that Google’s operating margins on sites other than its own must be much worse than 
FindWhat.com’s (23%) or Overture’s (12%) because it has been wooing advertisers away 
from Overture by being more generous to webmasters. 
One thing that might help against Microsoft, says Danny Sullivan, the editor of 
SearchEngineWatch.com, an online consumer guide to the industry, is Google’s image of 
‘niceness’ – at least by implicit comparison with the forces of darkness in Redmond. Scott 
Banister, a pioneer of paid-search technology (and now a founder of IronPort, an e-mail 
infrastructure firm), thinks that Google has already built sufficiently deep networks with 
advertisers to mount an effective resistance to Microsoft’s impending assault. 
Even so, Google is no sure thing – as those who hope to sell its shares are no doubt aware. 
John Doerr and Michael Moritz, for instance, between them also brought Netscape and 
Yahoo! to market, and may remember their lessons. With luck, Google’s owners will 
remember to work out a viable strategy for Google beyond the point at which they cash out. 
Source: The Economist, 11 January 2003, Vol. 369, Issue 8348, p. 57. 
 
Case Questions 
1 Describe Google’s strategy and explain how its business model works. 
2 What are the risks facing Google and how can it defend itself against them? 
3 What characteristics of the ‘new economy’ are present in this case? To what extent do 
these characteristics make the analysis of Google’s competitive position and its future 
strategic choices unique or unusual? 
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Case 2 Browser wars, part two 
Remember the browser wars, when Netscape and Microsoft fought for dominance of the 
web? For a while, each rushed out ever more complex browsers in the software equivalent of 
an arms race. In the end, Microsoft prevailed by bundling its browser with its Windows 
operating system. 
That fight may, however, prove to have been just a warm-up. Now a new browser war is 
under way, as software firms compete to provide the browsers for ‘information appliances’ 
such as set-top boxes, handheld computers and smart phones. Such devices are still in their 
infancy, but they are widely expected eventually to outnumber PCs. So the stakes in this new 
browser war are high. And this time round, the battlefield looks very different. 
For a start, Microsoft is almost nowhere to be seen. Its strongest weapon in the desktop 
browser wars – the ability to include new software as part of Windows, and thus ensure its 
installation on millions of PCs – no longer works. Microsoft’s cut-down version of Windows 
for appliances has been a flop, and the firm’s strategy of tying its browser to its operating 
system is no help if that system is not dominant. But Netscape, which is now part of AOL, is 
still very much in the running, alongside dozens of rivals including Opera, OpenTV, Lineo, 
QNX and Pixo. 
Another difference is that the appliance makers and service providers (such as cable-TV 
and mobile-phone companies) will decide which browser comes installed on a particular 
device. On a PC, a new browser can be downloaded and installed with a few clicks. Not so 
with appliances, whose users will have no choice in the matter. Rival browser makers are thus 
courting appliance makers and service providers, rather than trying to woo users. To maxi- 
mise its chances in this beauty contest, a browser must be fast and work with many different 
kinds of hardware. 
With so many firms in the race, it seems unlikely that any browser will win a dominant 
share. The resulting diversity will mean that, for everything to work properly, it will be vital 
that web pages and the browsers that display them conform to the technical standards laid 
down by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). So browser makers are rushing to show 
how well-behaved their software is. Contrast this with the old Microsoft-Netscape battle, 
when both firms added proprietary extensions to existing web standards in an attempt to 
lock in users. 
Netscape claims that its software, called Gecko, is the most standards-compliant browser 
around. Jon Stephenson von Tetzchner, Opera’s boss, makes a similar claim about his firm. 
The problem, he says, is that only 5% of web pages comply with W3C standards. Most are 
designed to look good on Netscape’s or Microsoft’s old browsers, rather than playing by the 
rules. On December 6th, Opera said it will offer the Windows version of its browser free. The 
idea, says Mr von Tetzchner, is to increase Opera’s market share and to encourage web 
designers to look beyond the ‘big two’ browsers to a more diverse future. 
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This is just one of the many subtle links between the old and new browser wars. Netscape’s 
new strategy is similarly informed by its bruising previous encounter with Microsoft. By 
making Gecko freely available, and encouraging its use with the free Linux operating system, 
it hopes to allow appliance makers to avoid ‘vendor lock-in’. Netscape does not benefit 
directly from this strategy, but the result is to make it hard for any single firm (i.e., 
Microsoft) to establish a stranglehold on the market. Although the new browser wars are 
very different from the old, in some respects little has changed. 
Source: ‘Browser wars, part two’, The Economist 14 December 2000. 
© The Economist Newspaper Limited, London (14 December 2000). 
 
Case Questions 
1 What was Microsoft’s strategy in the first browser wars? How important were 
network externalities in its thinking? 
2 Why is the new generation of browser wars different? Does Microsoft now have a 
competitive disadvantage? 
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